I presented this paper on God and the paranormal as a guest lecturer in Dr. Bruce Solheim’s Paranormal Personal History class at Citrus College, Glendora, California, on Tuesday, Oct. 23, 2018.
God and the Paranormal
When Bruce asked me to give a guest lecture for this class, I asked him what he would like for me to talk about. He suggested “God and the Paranormal.” I replied, “Good idea! If God isn’t paranormal, who or what is?” But what does “paranormal” mean, anyway? Philosophical questions are rarely, if ever, answered simply by looking up a word in a dictionary, but it is a place to begin. Here is the definition from Webster’s New World Collegiate Dictionary:
paranormal designating or of psychic or mental phenomena outside the range of the normal
I don’t know about you, but I’m not wildly enthusiastic about that way of defining it, since I don’t think we have a clear, uncontroversial conception of what is outside the range of the normal for purposes of this definition. For example, presumably the mental phenomena experienced by someone suffering from Alzheimer’s disease are outside the range of the normal, but I don’t think we would usually use the word “paranormal” to describe them.
Google Dictionary has the following:
paranormal denoting events or phenomena such as telekinesis or clairvoyance that are beyond the scope of normal scientific understanding
This definition is an improvement because it includes some helpful examples of what the term was coined to designate. And I won’t deny we need some idea of what is normal if we’re going to know what is para- or beyond normal. But this definition raises the question whether there might be some kind of non-normal scientific understanding and, if so, how it would relate to normal scientific understanding. For example, what about the psychic effects of ingesting a psychedelic substance such as LSD? Are they beyond the scope of normal scientific understanding, or not?
Cambridge Dictionary (online) gives us this:
paranormal impossible to explain by known natural forces or by science
I like this one the best because it doesn’t rely on knowing already what is “normal science” or what is inside or outside the “range of the normal.” Here is something to consider about this definition, though. Since “paranormal” is defined as “impossible to explain by known natural forces or by science,” we might ask: known by whom? Will what is paranormal be relative to each individual’s knowledge of natural forces or science? If so, one might think that the more ignorant a person is, the more things will be paranormal for him or her. Or, do we say that what we mean by the “known” in “impossible to explain by known natural forces or by science” is “known by scientific experts,” i.e., by those who know the most about natural forces? In that case, something that a less educated person about science would count as paranormal might be explainable in terms of natural forces by a more educated person about science, so that it wouldn’t really be paranormal after all. Furthermore, it could happen that something that was impossible to explain by the most well-informed scientific experts of an earlier era might have become explainable by experts of a later one.
Here is another thing to consider. Think of the examples of the miracles attributed to Jesus in the Gospels. Being able to do something of a certain sort indicates possession of effective knowledge of that sort of thing, doesn’t it? If Jesus was able to perform miracles, then he must have known how to perform miracles. So, even though those miracles seem paranormal to those of us who don’t know how to do them, including, presumably, the most well-credentialed physical scientists, they weren’t really paranormal because they would have been possible for Jesus to explain, had he chosen to do so.
Someone might object, “Well, sometimes people are able to do something without being able to explain how they do it.” Yes, that’s true, but in the case of Jesus, whom his followers came to believe was the son of God at least partly on the basis of his ability to perform miracles, it doesn’t seem likely that he could just do it without really understanding how. It seems more likely that if he didn’t explain how he did it other than by saying that whoever had seen him had seen the Father, it wasn’t because he didn’t know how he did it, but rather because he thought that we wouldn’t be able to understand the explanation, or else possibly because he didn’t think the how of it was what mattered.
So, again, either the miracles performed by Jesus weren’t really paranormal after all, or else we have to say “paranormal” means “impossible to explain as a result of natural forces by the experts on natural forces, except for the one who knows the most of all about natural forces, i.e., the one with the power to create or change natural forces.” In other words, if only God can understand it, then it’s paranormal.
A different objection would come from those who don’t believe Jesus really performed those miracles, that either they were made up later by people who had other reasons for believing in Jesus and wanted to enhance his reputation by getting people to believe he could perform miracles, or else that there was really some sort of natural explanation for what seemed to be a miracle in each case. Lazarus wasn’t really dead, but in a coma, for example. Or, it was probably an exaggeration that there were five thousand, and members of the crowd were satisfied with just a crumb of bread and a tiny piece of fish — it seemed like a feast to them — because they were so excited by Jesus’ teachings. Or, in the cases of miraculous healings, the blindness or lameness was hysterical and healed by the emotional well-being generated by the attention paid to the blind or lame person by the charismatic center of the crowd’s attention.
“Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” is a motto we are likely to hear when talking about miracles or the paranormal. So, here the question would be: does it count as extraordinary evidence that we have written records of multiple claims of Jesus performing miracles that have been preserved and handed down as sacred scriptures for 2000 years? Obviously, there will be disagreement about the answer to that question. So, we need to ask the general question: What would count as the kind of extraordinary evidence that should convince us that a miracle has taken place?
Before attempting to answer this question, let’s take a look at a dictionary definition of miracle. This is from Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 3rd edition, 1997, and I’m including the etymology, which I think is worth taking note of.
miracle OFr<L miraculum, a strange thing, in LL(Ec), miracle<mirari, to wonder at < mirus, wonderful < IE base *(s)mei-, to SMILE
1 an event or action that apparently contradicts known scientific laws and is hence thought to be due to supernatural causes, esp. to an act of God 2 a remarkable event or thing; a marvel 3 a wonderful example (a miracle of tact) 4 MIRACLE PLAY
In the “Guide to the Use of the Dictionary” at the front of the volume, the editors state that the order of senses in the definitions are usually in historical order, from the etymology (the sense or senses of a word before modern English times, through the original modern English sense to the most recent senses. They then admit that the exact historical development of a word is often obscure and that sometimes different meanings developed at about the same time. Now, for purposes of our discussion we aren’t interested in the fourth sense listed here, of a miracle play, which was a type of medieval religious dramas dealing with the lives of the saints. And I’m not particularly interested in sense 3, which seems to be the use of the word “miracle” as a bit of hyperbole, not to be taken literally. So, if we look at just senses 1 and 2, I think it is clear that sense 2 most closely reflects the etymology of the word. After all, in the etymology there is nothing about apparently contradicting known scientific laws, as in sense 1.
Here is one question we should ask: can something be remarkable, amazing, a marvel, mind-blowing (in the parlance of the 60s), and yet not be something that contradicts known scientific laws? I think it is clear that the answer is Yes. Aren’t there certain big moments in life, such as the moment one first discovers romantic love, or the moment one first sees one’s child, that are amazing, a marvel, and yet that don’t contradict known scientific laws? When we ask whether an event or action contradicts scientific laws, we are asking about how things are objectively, leaving aside anyone’s subjective, emotional feeling about it. When we ask whether something is amazing, wonderful, a marvel, something that makes us smile—a miracle in the original sense—we are asking precisely about someone’s subjective, emotional feeling about it.
Suppose a miracle in sense 1 occurs and is witnessed by a scientist who knows all about the scientific laws which are apparently contradicted by what he or she has just witnessed. For such a scientist, the event would probably be a miracle in both sense 1 and sense 2. He or she would know that it appears to contradict scientific laws and would also probably feel a sense of wonder, amazement, perhaps even dread about it. In contrast, I can imagine that there could be some non-scientist who observed the very same event—it might just be an arrow moving towards a certain number on a dial, for example—and would not be amazed or even all that interested. That event would not be a miracle in sense 2 for that non-scientist, even if told by the scientist that it was a miracle in sense 1. And for either a scientist or a non-scientist, I can imagine that an event—say the birth of a child or the successful recovery from a dangerous and life-saving surgery—could be a miracle in sense 2 but not in sense 1.
Now that we’ve differentiated between the subjective sense (sense 2) of miracle and the objective sense (sense 1), let’s see what light it sheds on our original question: What would count as the kind of extraordinary evidence that should convince us that a miracle has taken place? If we are asking about a miracle in sense 2, the answer would be simply the subjective feeling that something wonderful and amazing has just occurred. If we are asking about a miracle in sense 1, that subjective feeling of amazement may or may not be present. We would need whatever kind of evidence would be required to convince us that one or more scientific laws appear to have been contradicted by what just happened.
According to the eighteenth-century British philosopher, David Hume (1711-1776), the definition of miracle is exclusively that of a real and not just apparent violation of the laws of nature, and he claims to prove conclusively that we could have, at best, only a reason for believing that such a thing had appeared to happen, not that it had really happened.
He has a point, I think, at least about this: that when we use the word miracle in the objective sense (sense 1), we are saying more than that an event or action apparently contradicts known scientific laws. If it really is a miracle, then it really does contradict known scientific laws. For instance, we wouldn’t say that a trick performed by a magician was a miracle, even though it appeared to contradict known scientific laws. We might say that it appeared to be a miracle. So, a sense 1 miracle is something that really does contradict known scientific laws. Then we can ask if there really are any miracles in that sense of the word. That is what Hume does, and his is answer is No. I don’t think he is right, though, that this is the only meaning of miracle that is worthy of philosophical attention. And I don’t think he has proved the impossibility of a sense 1 miracle, as I will try to explain.
Hume argues as follows:
A law of nature holds without exception, so if an exception does occur, then it wasn’t really a law of nature after all. Since a miracle is, by definition, an exception to a law of nature, and a law of nature, by definition, holds without exception, a miracle is a contradiction in terms. Suppose someone reports to us an event which apparently conflicts with a law of nature. According to Hume, the only reason we could possibly have for believing such a report would be if we believed that that person’s trustworthiness was, in effect, itself a law of nature, that he or she always tells the truth and is never mistaken about anything, without exception. Then we would either have to abandon our belief that the reported event contradicted a law of nature or abandon our belief that the person’s trustworthiness was a law of nature. If we were more convinced of the person’s trustworthiness than we were that the event violated a law of nature, then we would believe that the event had actually happened, but that it was only an apparent miracle. Conversely, if we were not convinced of the person’s absolute trustworthiness, then, since what he or she reported appears to contradict a law of nature, we would believe that he or she was mistaken or lying. Either way, any subjective amazement would be irrelevant because we would still be assured that there is no possibility of a real miracle happening. [This argument in Hume’s own words is on the handout.]
If Hume’s reasoning is sound, it would show that if our only reason for believing in God is our belief in reports of miracles handed down in sacred scriptures, then we don’t really have a good reason for believing in God. Applying his argument to the reports of Jesus’s miracles in the Gospels, for example, we would have two alternatives: either 1) it is a law of nature that the writers of the Gospels infallibly told the truth, so that what they reported actually occurred but only appears to violate the laws of nature; or 2) what they reported really does contradict the laws of nature, didn’t actually happen, and we were wrong if we thought the Gospel writers were infallible truth-tellers. We would need a reason for preferring the first alternative, independent of believing already that God guarantees the truth of the Gospels, in order for the reports of Jesus’ miracles in the Gospels to count as evidence in favor of God’s existence. And it seems unlikely there would be such a reason to prefer the first alternative, since we know that even the best and brightest people at least sometimes lie or have mistaken beliefs, and it is pretty clear that the miracles reportedly performed by Jesus go way beyond what one would ordinarily expect to happen in the circumstances described, to such a degree that it isn’t a stretch to say that they are contradictions of laws of nature. People who have been dead for several days don’t naturally rise and walk out of their tombs upon being told to do so. Mixing dirt and spit and putting the resulting mud in the eyes of a blind person isn’t normally a cure for blindness. It isn’t a natural turn of events when a crowd of five thousand people can all be satisfactorily fed by a few fishes and loaves of bread. Normally, people can’t walk on the surface of a non-frozen lake.
But is Hume’s reasoning sound? The dictionary gives us a reason to doubt his premise that “miracle” just means a contradiction of one or more laws of nature, namely, that there is another sense of the word—and etymologically the original sense—according to which a miracle is something that is a cause for wonder and amazement, without regard to whether or not it contradicts a law of nature. But Hume if he were here, or a defender of Hume, could readily admit that there is this other sense and ask us to consider the soundness of his reasoning if we focus on the sense of the word according to which a miracle is something that at least apparently contradicts one or more laws of nature. The point of the argument is that this can never be anything more than an appearance, since a law of nature doesn’t allow for exceptions. Someone who doesn’t really understand the law of gravity, for example, might think that it is contradicted by the weightlessness of astronauts in the Space Station, whereas a scientifically educated person would know that their weightlessness is perfectly consistent with the law of gravity.
So, the question is: is it true that a law of nature, such as the law of gravity, would not be a law of nature after all if there were even one genuine, and not merely apparent, exception to it, as, for example, if a man really did walk, with no special equipment, across the surface of a non-frozen, water-filled lake, here on earth?
Suppose the following is true: God exists and is the creator and sustainer of the universe, so that what we discover and call the laws of nature are the predictable regularities he builds into the universe. He could change them any time he wants. Most of the time he doesn’t want to, because it would make it difficult for us to live and learn to love him as he loves us if the world were too unpredictable; but at certain times he suspends one or more laws temporarily. He does this in order to remind us of his existence. Then he restores the laws just as they were before. If all this is the case, would Hume be right to conclude that these laws of nature—the ones God suspended—were never really laws in the first place? Surely, it is more reasonable to think that this is one way in which a law of nature could have an exception, that is, that the creator of that law could suspend or change it and then reinstate it. [This view is expressed by Milton in the passage on the handout.]
The point is that Hume’s premise that a law of nature cannot have any exceptions and still be a law of nature depends on the assumption that either there is no God or that, if there is, He never temporarily suspends a law and then reinstates it. And it would be circular reasoning to think that an argument proves what it assumes to be true.
So, here is where we stand. If Hume’s argument is sound, it would show that if our only reason for believing in God is our belief in reports of miracles, then we don’t really have a good reason for believing in God. However, his argument is not sound unless either there is no God or, if God exists, He never performs miracles. We seem to be at a stalemate that leaves us unsure whether his argument is sound.
Can we get beyond this stalemate? One consideration that seems to tip the scales in Hume’s favor is the observation that it is a sound methodological principle in science to assume that there is a natural explanation, in terms of physical laws, for whatever one is trying to explain. Bringing in the acts of a supernatural being as part of the explanation means it is no longer a scientific explanation. Science is the pursuit of the kind of knowledge that gives us more predictive power, and to bring in the power of the deity in order to explain something is to admit that we don’t have predictive power concerning that thing.
But, I said “seems to tip the scales in Hume’s favor” because I believe we can give due weight to that methodological principle and still realize that science does not and cannot give us the whole truth about reality. The reason is that another methodological principle of science is to omit any emotional or otherwise subjective considerations from its account of things. A scientific description is an impersonal one, as if from no particular point of view, or from an all-seeing God’s-eye point of view. And yet each of us experiences the world from a subjective, first-person point of view. When we are pursuing science or trying to act justly, we can and should put aside our personal biases and try to imagine the situation from the perspective of an ideal, impartial observer. But that we each have a subjective, first-person perspective is just as factual, just as much a part of the way things are, as any objective, scientific fact.
We have already noticed how Hume’s argument depends on the premise that only the objective sense 1 of the definition of miracle matters. It isn’t surprising, then, that his argument concerns the trustworthiness, or lack of it, of other people’s testimony about the occurrence of miracles. He doesn’t talk about a case in which you see for yourself what appears to be a miracle.
One can doubt the testimony of one’s own senses up to a certain point. We know there are such things as optical illusions, mirages, and hallucinations, and that when we wake up from a dream, those dreamed events didn’t occur in our waking life. But if we doubt everything that our senses tell us, we have to give up any thought of empirical scientific proofs. And I submit that anyone who has had a mystical or religious experience cannot doubt that nature is not quite as mechanically predictable as Hume’s conception of exceptionless laws of nature would require.
This is related to an independent reason for believing in God—independent of whether or not he ever suspends or changes the laws of nature—and one that has convinced me that God exists. This reason is that it is a fact that, out of all the people that there are, I am just this one and nobody else, and the same is true for you and for everyone else. An account of reality that omits that fact would be incomplete. It would be like trying to use a map to get somewhere without knowing what point on the map represents your current location. It would render you incapable of using such words as “here,” “now,” “this,” and “I.” This fact, of which person I am, which person you are, is an essentially personal fact, and it doesn’t make sense to me to think that it could be given by some set of impersonal laws of nature. It makes more sense to me to believe that God, who is a person and not a thing or a force or a collection of things and forces, creates a universe that is predictable enough to be interesting to all the subjects of experience he also creates, each being one particular creature and not any other, and each with his or her own first-person perspective from which he or she experiences the world. Given this independent reason for believing in God, reports of miracles in sense 1 as well as sense 2 become much more believable. Surely, the one who creates the predictability can also suspend it or change it in ways that we don’t understand.
Thus, I think that Hume’s argument is not sound, because it depends on the false assumption that either there is no God or, if there is, He never performs miracles. So, Hume hasn’t convinced me that if our only reason for believing in God is our belief in reports of miracles, then we have no good reason for believing in God. Furthermore, believing that miracles are possible makes one more open to the possibility of experiencing a miracle oneself, so that it isn’t only a question of believing the reports of others. And if one has experienced a miracle, it makes it more likely that one will believe in some miracles reported by others. Of course, it doesn’t follow that every report of a miracle or of some paranormal phenomenon is true. As I said before, even the best and brightest sometimes lie or are mistaken in their interpretation of what they have experienced. For that reason, it is reasonable to be skeptical when someone claims something has happened that is impossible to explain by known natural forces or by science. The Bible itself warns us against false claims of miracles. But it is not reasonable to dismiss automatically all claims of miracles or paranormal phenomena, on the grounds that a miracle is by definition a contradiction of one or more laws of nature, and that a law of nature, by definition, can have no real contradictions. We simply don’t know that, and furthermore, I think we have good reason to doubt it. We have no good reason to restrict the meaning of miracle to the objective sense 1, and a miracle in the subjective sense 2 is just something amazing or wonderful, whether or not it conflicts with a law of nature. And we don’t have any good reason to think a law of nature cannot be temporarily suspended or changed.
The foregoing reflections lead me to the following conclusions:
Paranormal phenomena, which are impossible to explain by known natural laws or by science, may yet one day be so explained; so they call out for more scientific research. A miracle in sense 2 that turns out to be explainable in terms of natural forces may be one of the realest and most significant things that have happened in one’s life. But if it turns out never to be explainable in that way, we should not for that reason conclude that it is unreal or insignificant. It would then be a miracle in sense 1 that is not just apparently but actually impossible to explain in terms of natural forces. And it would still be one of the realest and most significant things that have happened in one’s life.