Spinoza’s stone example and the “illusion” of free will

Spinoza asks us to imagine a stone that is moving through the air (say, because someone has thrown it or it has been dislodged and is falling over a cliff) and says that if that stone were self-conscious, it would be convinced that it was moving of its own accord. (And Einstein, following Spinoza, used a similar example involving the moon being self-conscious and believing it had freely decided to orbit the earth.) And this is supposed to help convince us that we are similarly deluded when we think we can freely decide to raise an arm, for example. But when we are pushed by someone else or trip and fall, we don’t think we freely decided to move. And we clearly conceive the difference between, for example,  1) freely deciding to lie down on the ground, and 2) tripping and falling and finding ourselves lying on the ground. Furthermore, if we imagine a stone being self-conscious, we can easily imagine two alternatives in which it is not deluded: 1) it, the magically self-conscious stone, realizes it can never move on its own; 2) it, the magically self-conscious stone, can freely decide to move on its own and also knows that it isn’t moving on its own when someone has picked it up and thrown it or when it has been dislodged and is falling over a cliff. Spinoza’s (and Einstien’s) example should convince no one that free will is an illusion.